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I. INTRODUCTION
The very first issue to which the Governor's Commission turned its attention
in its 1978 Final Report was uncertainty in water rights.' In the Commission's
view, uncertainty was a major problem that needed quick legislative correction.
Current water users, however, face even greater uncertainty than water users did
in 1978. Most of the uncertainties that the Commission identified remain, while
new uncertainties have piled on top. In terms of legal uncertainty, today's water
users must worry that they might lose some or all of their water supplies as a
result of the public trust doctrine,2  Endangered Species Act,3  and other
environmental statutes of which water users a quarter century ago were happily
* Robert E. Paradise Professor of Natural Resources Law, Stanford Law School, and Co-Director,
Stanford University Institute for the Environment.
1. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT 16-49 (Dec.
1978) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
2. See Cynthia Koehler, Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Resolution of the Mono Lake
Controversy, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541 (1995).
3. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004); see, e.g., United States v. Glenn-Colusa
Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (enjoining a water district from pumping water during the
peak migration season of a threatened fish species).
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ignorant. Moreover, both the federal and state governments have shown greater
willingness to utilize their "reasonable use" powers to curtail water rights than
they exercised in earlier eras (although even today neither level of government
could be described as anywhere close to activist).4 Current water users also face
greater natural uncertainties, stemming from both the possibility of global
climate change5 and a growth in water demand that provides less wiggle room for
water suppliers in cases of long-term droughts.6
So what should be done? The Governor's Commission seemed to view uncertainty
as inherently bad and the answer to it as straight forward and obvious, if not always
simple or costless: eliminate it. According to the Commission, the "consequences of
uncertainty are manifold" and, based on everything the Commission said, uniformly
negative.7 Uncertainty contributes to a sense of personal insecurity;8 undercuts
"planning and rational investment;" 9 "hampers the local management and
supervision of water users," as well as state administration of water rights;' 0 and
leads to "recurrent and costly litigation."' 1 The Commission, moreover, seemed
to find all forms of uncertainty equally pernicious. The Commission thus lumped
together the non-quantification of pre-1914 appropriative water rights, the right
to assert future uses against present appropriators under various doctrines
(including the riparian doctrine, the "relation back" doctrine, "state filings," and
the statutory exemption of municipalities from the standard due diligence
requirement), and case-by-case determinations of whether water uses are
"reasonable" under article X of the California Constitution. 2
This article has two purposes. The first is to suggest a more nuanced and
analytical view of the appropriate public policy approach to uncertainty in water
rights. Although the law occasionally can create uncertainty, the law more frequently
manages uncertainty that emanates from information gaps, unpredictable changes in
4. See, e.g., Samantha Spangler, Imperial Irrigation District v. State Water Resources Control Board:
Board as Arbiter of Reasonable and Beneficial Use of California Water, 19 PAC. L.J. 1565 (1988) (discussing
state board's efforts to reduce water use by Imperial Irrigation District).
5. For a description of the possible effects of global climate change on California water resources, see
Peter H. Gleick, Pac. Inst. for Studies in Dev., Env't, and Sec., Water: The Potential Consequences of Climate
Variability and Change for the Water Resources of the United States, available at http://www.pacinst.org/
reports/national_assessment/ncawater.pdf (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) and Cal. Energy
Comm'n, The Effects of Global Climate Change on California Water Resources, Apr. 2003, available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/ 2 003-04-16_500-03-025FA-II.PDF (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
6. As demand grows relative to supply, water suppliers face a condition known as "demand hardening"
in which it becomes more difficult to respond to drought conditions without significant cost to customers. See
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Management and Land Use Planning: Is It Time for Greater Coordination?, in
WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL LAND USE? 95, 111 (Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, ed. 2005).
7. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 21-25.
8. Id. at 16.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 21-22.
11. Id. at 22.
12. Id. at 17-21.
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the physical world, and the passage of time. A principal issue in water law therefore
is how best to eliminate, minimize, and mitigate the harms from such uncertainty
and, to the degree that the harm cannot be totally eliminated, how best to allocate the
burden of the uncertainty among members of society (as well as other living species).
Even legally-created uncertainty is not always bad. The flip-side of uncertainty is
flexibility. Legal regimes that legitimately wish to provide decision makers with the
discretion to consider a broad range of factors in deciding individual matters-i.e., to
provide administrative flexibility-inevitably must create a significant degree of
legal uncertainty.
My second purpose is to highlight the important connection between markets
and uncertainty. In its report, the Governor's Commission emphasized the
problems that uncertainty can pose for the effective operation of markets (which
the Commission in turn found important in achieving efficiency), noting that
"[o]ne requirement of transferability is that the acquired water right be a certain
and secure right. Lack of security may reduce investment in the resource by
reducing the value of the right." 13 The Commission consequently recommended
that the Legislature not only encourage the quantification of water rights through
statutory adjudications, but also eliminate uncertainty over whether temporary
transfers of water could result in the forfeiture of the underlying water right.14 As
discussed below, markets also can play an important role in reducing uncertainty
and the harms that uncertainty generates. 5 In short, markets are as important in
reducing the burdens of water uncertainty as eliminating uncertainty is to
promoting water markets. If California and the federal government want to
reduce the evils of uncertainty for water users, one of the strongest steps that they
can take is to further promote the development of robust water markets.
II. THE COSTS OF UNCERTAINTY
It is important to differentiate at the outset two concepts that are often closely
interlinked in the legal issues discussed in Chapter II of the Governor's
Commission's Final Report (entitled "Toward Greater Certainty in Water Rights")
but that the Governor's Commission does not clearly distinguish: "uncertainty," and
what I will call "insecurity" of existing water rights. To see the difference, consider
the problem of unexercised riparian water rights. As a result of unexercised riparian
rights, riparians can reclaim water in the future from appropriators if they find that
they have a reasonable and beneficial need for additional water.16 As the Governor's
Commission observes, unexercised riparian rights present a classic case of
uncertainty because current appropriators can never be sure whether a riparian will
13. Id. at 62.
14. Id. at 66.
15. See infra Part IV.B.
16. For the classic statement of the right, see WELLS A. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER
RIGHTS 89 (1956).
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claim more water and, if so, when and how much.' 7 Current appropriators, however,
might not be much happier if the uncertainty were eliminated, and they knew for sure
that riparians would claim from them a fixed amount of water at a fixed point in the
future. Current appropriators, in short, are upset by the "insecurity" of their rights,
not just the uncertainty surrounding that insecurity.
Like the Governor's Commission, however, I will limit my discussion in this
Article to the problem of uncertainty. Insecurity in most cases would not seem to be a
serious problem. Land owners, for example, often lease their land for limited periods
of time recognizing that they might have a more valuable use for the land in the
future. The insecurity inherent in limited leaseholds, however, leads to social
problems only in special situations where, for example, limited tenures create strong
personal attachments to the land that the law might wish to protect even after the
tenure ends' 8 or provide landlords with high financial leverage if tenants wish to
renew a lease at the end of the term.19 If a riparian knows that she will need a set
amount of currently unused water ten years from now, there seems no policy reason
in the abstract not to award the riparian a future right to the water but permit others to
utilize the water on a short-term basis in the interim. 20 Uncertainty, by contrast, poses
serious policy concerns.
Uncertainty imposes three broad costs on society. First and foremost, uncertainty
makes it difficult to plan and manage activities.21 In deciding what actions to take,
private individuals and governmental officials weigh the pros and cons of their
options based on assumptions regarding the present and future states of the world. By
making it difficult to determine these states accurately, uncertainty raises the chance
that people will make the wrong decision. Western farmers, for example, must
decide what crops, if any, to grow based on how much water they will have to
irrigate the crops. If the crops die because the farmers end up with far less water than
they expected due to uncertainties about their water rights or about annual
precipitation levels, both the farmers and society lose the value of the resources that
17. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 21 (noting that future riparian claims are "unfixed" and only
"potential").
18. This is one of the arguments for rent control and for prohibiting the ejection of tenants from
apartments. See Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 359-60 (1986)
(arguing for rent control on the basis of personal attachment to residences).
19. This concern may have inspired Hawaii's efforts to provide fee simple interests to tenants facing the
expiration of their long-term land leases. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
20. In deciding in specific situations whether to grant riparians a future right, the law should try to
determine whether the current present value of the future right and whatever use of the water can be made in the
interim is greater or less than the value of awarding a perpetual right to someone else. In the abstract, there is no
reason to believe that the current present value would be more in one case than in the other. If robust water
markets existed, of course, this would not be an issue because the market would ensure that the water went to
the highest use, even if the law initially awarded rights to the lower value uses.
21. For discussions of this point in various contexts, see Jon Elster, Taming Chance: Randomization in
Individual and Social Decisions, in 9 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 105, 110 (Grethe B.
Peterson ed., 1988) ("It is true that uncertainty makes it difficult to plan for the future .. ") and RiCHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 3 (1985) ("Uncertainty and
insecurity make it difficult to plan ... ").
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went into planting and tending the crops-resources that could have been used
productively elsewhere. Wildlife officials, to consider another example, must decide
when to release water from dams in order to enhance downstream fish habitat. If the
fish migrate at a later point in time than the officials predicted due to uncertainties
regarding when the fish will migrate, fish may die, and society may unnecessarily
lose the hydroelectric or other value of the water that was mistakenly released earlier
in the year.
Second, largely for these reasons, high levels of uncertainty impose psychological
costs on individuals confronted by uncertainty. Most people are averse to risk.22
Although most individuals tolerate a moderate level of uncertainty, people can become
worried, fearful, anxious, agitated, or preoccupied if confronted by high levels of
uncertainty on important issues.23 These psychic tolls are real costs, and they exist
whether or not a person ultimately turns out to have guessed right in the face of the
uncertainty. The farmer who ultimately receives enough water to keep his crops from
dying may still have spent the winter and spring worrying whether legal or natural
restrictions might prevent him from receiving that water.
The psychological trauma from uncertainty can vary significantly from person to
person. People, for example, vary substantially in their degree of risk aversion. Some
people may be neutral toward the risk of uncertainty, at least within the likely range
of uncertainty that they confront; others may even be risk seekers and thrive in an
24
environment of uncertainty. Even people with the same degree of risk aversion may
differ in their psychological reaction to any given level of uncertainty. For one
person, a high degree of uncertainty may mean an occasional lost night of sleep; to
another person, the uncertainty may prove to be a "247" preoccupation that
interferes with other daily activities.
22. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-13 (4th ed. 1992); Robert D. Cooter &
Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments, 66 TEX. L. REV. 63, 70-71 (1987); see
also Hans P. Binswanger, Attitude Toward Risk: Experimental Measurement in Rural India, 62 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 395 (1980) (experimental study finding that farmers in rural India are risk averse); JOY HARWOOD Er
AL., MANAGING RISK IN FARMING: CONCEPTS, RESEARCH, AND ANALYSIS 3 (Mar. 1999), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer774/aer774.pdf (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting
that most farmers are risk averse).
23. See, e.g., Veronica Greco & Derek Roger, Uncertainty, Stress, and Health, 34 PERSONALITY &
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1057 (2003) (examining the relationship between uncertainty and stress); A. Monat,
J. Averill, & R. Lazarus, Anticipatory Stress and Coping Reactions under Various Conditions of Uncertainty,
24 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 237 (1972) (concluding that uncertainty creates strong stress); Jose
Antonio Viera-Gallo, Ethical Issues in International Legal Education, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1391, 1392
(1999) (noting that uncertainty in transitionary periods can cause feelings of instability, fear, and anxiety);
Karrie J. Craig et al., Environmental Factors in the Etiology of Anxiety (2000), available at http://www.acnp.
org/g4/GN401000127/CH125.html (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (recognizing that anxiety
may be associated with uncertainty).
24. See HARWOOD ET AL., supra note 22, at 3 (discussing that farmers vary in their attitudes toward
risk); see also John C. Johanson, Correlations of Self-Esteem and Intolerance of Ambiguity with Risk Aversion,
87 PSYCHOL. REP. 534 (2000) (examining relationship between self-esteem and risk aversion); Melanie Powell
& David Ansic, Gender Differences in Risk Behaviour in Financial Decision-Making: An Experimental
Analysis, 18 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 605 (1997) (examining gender differences in risk aversion).
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Third, the steps that people take to avoid or reduce the risks of uncertainty
are also costly to themselves and to society. As discussed in Part Il, people enjoy
a number of means by which they can mitigate the risks posed by uncertainty.
Insurance, the principal means by which people try to avoid the risks of
uncertainty, is a trillion dollar industry in the United States with over 2.5 million
employees.25 Although insurance itself simply reallocates risk among individuals,
and thus is not a net cost to society, the administrative cost of insurance
constitutes a real loss of resources that could productively be used elsewhere in
the economy. As the Governor's Commission emphasized, another means by
which water users can try to reduce the risks from legal uncertainty surrounding
those rights is to pursue lawsuits to clarify the water rights.26 Such lawsuits can
generate sizable legal and expert expenses and consume valuable judicial
resources, yet may not even achieve the degree of certainty sought.27
III. SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY AND THE ROLE OF THE LAW
Although uncertainty is always costly, that does not mean that uncertainty is
necessarily bad, nor does it tell us how the law can best deal with uncertainty.
Uncertainty in most cases is unavoidable-the consequence of unpredictable
temporal changes and limited information. The best that the law can do is to try
to reduce the overall cost of that uncertainty to society. In other cases, the law
itself creates uncertainty. The issue in these instances is whether that uncertainty
poses a net benefit or loss to society.
A. Legally Exogenous Uncertainty
Most of the uncertainty that water users currently face is exogenous to the
law. The law itself merely allocates the burden of that uncertainty and establishes
the institutional setting within which people can try to reduce or mitigate the
burden. This section considers the sources of that uncertainty and how best to
structure legal rules to address the uncertainty.
1. Three Examples
To see how uncertainty is typically exogenous to the law itself, and- not a
creation of the law, consider three examples of uncertainty faced by California water
25. U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 Economic Census: Table 1-Advance Summary Statistics for the United
States-2002 NAICS Basis, at http://www.census.gov/econ/censusO2/advancefrABLE1.HTM (last visited Sept.
3, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
26. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-25 (discussing the "recurrent and costly" litigation surrounding
water rights to the Kings River).
27. Id. at 22 (noting that the Kings River litigation "provides a very clear example of the inability of the
private lawsuit to put an end to disputes over water and to bring certainty to water users").
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users: global climate change, unexercised riparian rights, and the Endangered Species
Act. The worldwide emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases has
significantly increased the uncertainty regarding the amounts of water that will be
needed by and available for California water users in future decades.28 Although
additional scientific modeling and research ultimately may reduce the level of
uncertainty, and permit us to make more accurate predictions of future water supplies
and demand, the law itself cannot reduce or eliminate the uncertainty. The law only
can allocate who bears the burden of that uncertainty. The law, for example, could
decide that all water users should bear the uncertainty equally by providing that, in
years with below-normal water supplies, all water rights will be cut back
proportionately. California's actual water law has placed the burden of climate-
change uncertainty on the shoulders of junior appropriators who receive their water
only if adequate supplies exist.
29
Unexercised riparian water rights might be a less obvious example of
exogenous uncertainty, at least at first glance. The Governor's Commission
appeared to view unexercised riparian rights as an example of a perverse legal
uncertainty that the law itself could eliminate. According to the Governor's
Commission, a riparian's right to make new uses in the future at the expense of
existing water users is "but one aspect of the uncertainty inherent in the riparian
doctrine.,30 To eliminate uncertainty, the Commission therefore recommended
that the Legislature give California courts and agencies the power in statutory
adjudications to quantify riparian uses and relegate unexercised riparian rights to
the bottom of the priority list.31 However, the core uncertainty here does not flow
from the law, but is exogenous to it: riparian land owners do not know whether
they will need additional water in the future and, if so, how much they will need.
The law can only allocate the burden of, not eliminate, this uncertainty. Under
the traditional California rule, appropriators downstream of riparians bore the
burden of this uncertainty; under the Commission's recommendation, the
underlying uncertainty remains, but riparians now bear the burden after their
rights are quantified in a statutory adjudication. The question for the law, to
which I will return momentarily, should be which allocation of the uncertainty
best promotes efficiency and equity.
Unexercised riparian rights are but one example of a number of "rights to
future use" that the Commission attacked as a "source of uncertainty in
California water rights law."32 As the Commission noted, the statutory exemption
28. See generally Cal. Energy Comm'n, supra note 5; Gleick, supra note 5.
29. JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 302 (3d ed. 2000) (describing the
legal priorities among California water users).
30. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 20 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 29-30, 38. Although the Legislature did not adopt the Commission's recommendation, the
California Supreme Court decided a year after the Commission released its final report that the State Water
Resources Control Board enjoys the discretion under existing law to quantify riparian rights and assign lowest
priority to unexercised rights. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 590 P.2d 656 (Cal. 1979).
32. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 18-19.
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of cities and counties from the "due diligence" requirement, "state filings," and
the "relation back" doctrine all leave current water users at risk that others will be
able to step in at some point in the future and assert superior water rights.33 In all
of these instances, however, the uncertainty lies in our inability to predict with
total accuracy the future needs of cities and other water users. The best that the
law can do is to allocate the burden of that uncertainty wisely.
A final example of exogenous uncertainty is the Endangered Species Act.
34
Although water users may accuse the Act itself of creating uncertainty, scientific
and not legal uncertainty is the root problem. Scientists are uncertain about the
specific water needs of most endangered and threatened fish species.35 In the
Sacramento and San Joaquin River systems and delta, for example, scientists
cannot predict exactly when the endangered winter run chinook salmon will
migrate, nor do they know exactly how various water conditions affect the
salmon or threatened delta smelt.36 The law cannot eliminate this scientific
uncertainty, so again the law is reduced to deciding how best to allocate the
burden of the uncertainty. On its surface, the Endangered Species Act appears to
allocate the burden to water users: if scientists discover that a protected fish
species needs more water, the users must reduce their diversions and use.37
Alternatively, the law could allocate the burden of such scientific uncertainty to
members of the public by requiring the government to compensate water users,
or buy water rights, if the government unexpectedly realizes that it needs more
water to protect the fish. As explained later, this is the path that the federal
government and California took in establishing the Environmental Water
Account for the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta;38 it also is the result under the
federal government's "No Surprises" policy 39 and under a federal judicial
decision requiring the government to pay "just compensation" as a matter of
33. Id. at 19-20.
34. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
35. For a general discussion of some of the scientific uncertainty confronting application of the
Endangered Species Act, see NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 143-
55 (1995).
36. See Envtl. Water Account Review Bd., Review of CALFED 2001-2002 Environmental Water Account
(EWA) Implementation, at 10-11, 18-35, Dec. 2002, available at http:/science.calwater.ca.gov/Pdf/EWAReview
Final_l-27-03.pdf (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the scientific needs for managing the
winter nin chinook salmon and delta smelt through the CALFED Environmental Water Account).
37. Under section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, governmental agencies such as the Federal Bureau
of Reclamation, which provides water to most California farmers, cannot do anything that would jeopardize an
endangered species-no matter what the cost to water users. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536. Under section 9 of the Act,
state and private water users cannot do anything that would modify the habitat of a species and lead to the injury
or death of a member of the species. Id. § 1538; see also SAX ET AL., supra note 29, at 571-82 (discussing
implications of the Endangered Species Act for water rights).
38. See infra Part IV.B.2.
39. See Eric Fisher, Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: No Surprises &
the Quest for Certainty, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 371, 386-87 (1996) (describing the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service's
"No Surprises" policy under which property owners who enter into habitat conservation plans are assured the
government will not require them to take additional measures without compensation to protect species).
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constitutional law to farmers whose water is used to protect endangered species.4°
Finally, the law could decide to allocate the burden to the fish and to let the fish
die if scientists discover that the fish need more water than was initially set aside
for them.
2. Minimizing the Burden of the Uncertainty
Where uncertainty is exogenous, the law typically cannot eliminate the
uncertainty. The law, however, can try to minimize the overall burden to society
of the uncertainty in several ways. First, the law can create and support various
methods by which people faced by uncertainty can reduce the resulting burden on
them. As discussed in Part IV of this article, water markets can provide a critical
means of reducing the burden of uncertainty. By providing the legal
infrastructure for water markets and actively encouraging such markets, the
government can help reduce the harm from uncertainty in water rights and
deliveries. People also can reduce the individual burden to them of uncertainty by
purchasing insurance, which spreads the risk of the uncertainty among a larger
group of individuals, or by diversifying their involvement in uncertain or risky
activities or holdings. 4' Rather than risk all of their income on uncertain water
rights, for example, farmers might choose to purchase water-rights insurance (to
cover the cost of lost crops if water diversions are suddenly curtailed) or pool
their water rights with others (in order to spread across a broader set of
individuals the risk that specific water deliveries will be cut). The law can help in
these efforts by providing the necessary legal infrastructure for water insurance
or by creating new entities such as water districts that may provide a means for
multiple water users to pool their rights.
Second, the law can allocate the burden of uncertainty in a manner that
minimizes the overall impact of the uncertainty on society. As discussed earlier,
the law generally has the option of allocating the burden of uncertainty among
specific individuals and entities or to society as a whole. The important question
for the law is how best to allocate the burden of uncertainty. Basic risk theory
40. See Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. CI. 313 (2001) (holding that the
federal government must compensate holders of state contractual water rights who were denied water as a result
of application of the Endangered Species Act).
41. See Peter H. Huang, Corporate Finance: Teaching Corporate Law from an Option Perspective, 34
GA. L. REV. 571, 594 (2000) (listing methods of addressing risk).
42. Although there does not appear to be an active market in water disruption insurance, a number of
companies have begun to provide title insurance for water acquisitions. See, e.g., Stewart Information Services
Corp., Stewart Water Information LLC, at http://www.stewart.com/sections.jsp?channelld=9&pageld=6 2 3 (last
visited Sept. 3, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the availability of title
insurance for water rights in the western United States). Insurance, in turn, requires efficacious regulatory
systems. See KENNETH A. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1986) (discussing legal issues in insurance policy). For a discussion of some of the pooling functions of water
districts, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV.
673, 695-96 (1993) (discussing the sharing of shortages during droughts).
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and other policy considerations point to several potential guidelines for allocating
the burden of uncertainty where rights to resources such as water are at stake:
43
* Guideline # 1: Allocate the burden of uncertainty to those individuals
or entities that have the greatest access to information regarding the
actual range of uncertainty. Uncertainty often stems from both an
inability to predict the future and a lack of information regarding the
future. In these settings, some individuals or entities may have greater
access to information concerning the future. If so, the law may be able to
minimize the amount of uncertainty, and thus the burden of that
uncertainty to society, by allocating the burden of the uncertainty to
those individuals or entities with the greatest access to relevant
information.
* Guideline # 2: Allocate the consequences of uncertainty to those
individuals or entities that are risk neutral or risk seeking. As discussed
earlier, people and entities vary in their reactions to and preferences for
various levels of risk.44 Although most people are risk averse, some
individuals and entities are risk neutral or perhaps even risk seekers. The
law can try to minimize the total burden of uncertainty by allocating the
risks of uncertainty to those individuals or entities that are not risk
averse.
e Guideline # 3: Allocate the burden of uncertainty in order to minimize the
psychological injury from the uncertainty. Again, as discussed in Part II,
some people may suffer greater psychological injury in comparison to others
when experiencing a given level of uncertainty. If possible, the law should
avoid allocating the burden of uncertainty to those individuals who suffer
high levels of psychological injury from uncertainty (or to organizations
with high proportions of such individuals). Unfortunately, determining
which individuals are most likely to suffer high levels of psychological
injury is likely to be a very daunting task for the government.
* Guideline # 4: Allocate the burden of uncertainty to those individuals
or entities who may need more of a resource as a result of uncertainty
rather than to those individuals who are at risk of losing the resource.
Prospect theory has shown that people suffer "losses" more than they
value "gains. '45 In any given situation, some people may view uncertainty
from a "gain" framework while others view the same uncertainty from a
43. Although these guidelines are addressed to determining legal entitlement to resources, most of the
guidelines should be equally applicable to other legal rules involving the allocation of uncertainty.
44. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
45. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
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"loss" framework. If so, the law may be able to minimize the overall societal
harm from uncertainty by allocating the burden of uncertainty to those who
view the uncertainty from a "gain" framework. It is important to emphasize,
however, that determining the likely "framing" of events as "gains" or
"losses" can be extremely tricky and variable, particularly because the law
itself can influence whether something is viewed as a gain or loss.
46
* Guideline # 5: Allocate the burden of uncertainty to those individuals
or entities that can best minimize the harm of the uncertainty. Some
individuals and entities may be more flexible in their decisions and
actions and thus better able to minimize the potential harm from
uncertainty. If so, the law may be able to minimize the societal harm
from uncertainty by allocating the burden of the uncertainty to these
individuals.
* Guideline # 6: Allocate the burden of uncertainty to those individuals
or entities that can best minimize the burden through insurance or other
mechanisms. As previously discussed, individuals and entities faced with
uncertainty often can try to minimize the burden through insurance,
diversification, or other risk-spreading mechanisms.47 Individuals and
entities may vary in their ability to minimize the burden of uncertainty
through such mechanisms. Some individuals or entities, for example,
might be able to more readily diversify their activities or holdings,
perhaps because they have more resources. If so, the law might be able to
minimize the overall societal burden of- uncertainty by allocating the
burden of uncertainty to these individuals.
e Guideline # 7: Allocate the burden of uncertainty to those individuals
and entities that currently face the lowest overall uncertainty. People and
entities may differ in the amount of baseline uncertainty that they face. In
general, for example, one would expect that farmers, who must face
uncertainty in weather conditions, crop diseases, and market prices, face
more uncertainty than the residents of suburban communities. Assuming
all else is equal (and, of course, that is a heroic assumption), the law
might choose to allocate the burden of uncertainty to those groups or
entities who face the lowest overall baseline of uncertainty, both because
the burden of uncertainty might be greatest at high overall levels and as a
matter of equity.
46. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30
ENvTL. L. 241, 256-57 n.98 (2000) (noting that solutions to the tragedy of the commons can typically be viewed
from either a loss framework or a gains framework).
47. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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3. Rights to Future Use
To see how the law might use these guidelines in a real context, consider the
problem of "rights to future use" discussed above and by the Governor's
Commission.48 Start with unexercised riparian rights. Although the law cannot
eliminate the uncertainty regarding riparians' future water needs, the law can
choose between allocating the burden of the uncertainty to current appropriators
(the traditional rule) or to the riparian (the rule favored by the Governor's
Commission). The uncertainty-allocation guidelines outlined above would
advocate for the latter rule. Riparians are likely to have more information
regarding their potential future needs than the appropriators and thus face less
uncertainty. Riparians also are likely to view the need for additional water in the
future as an opportunity for "gain" (e.g., because advances in agriculture may
permit them to plant twice a year rather than only once), while appropriators are
almost certain to view giving up water to riparians as a "loss." Under prospect
theory, riparians may view the risk that they will want more water as less severe
than appropriators will view the risk that they will have to give up water.49
The case against governmental "rights of future use" (i.e., the statutory
exemption of cities and counties from the due diligence requirement, as well as "state
filings") seems even stronger, although the Governor's Commission after listing such
governmental rights as a source of uncertainty makes no recommendation for
eliminating them, perhaps because of political reality. The same case that can be
made for allocating the uncertainty of future needs to riparians can be made for
allocating the uncertainty of future needs to cities, counties, and the state: the
governments are likely to have more information about future needs and view future
water as a "gain" not a "loss." Governments, moreover, may be more capable of
finding alternative sources of water if and when they need them and are less likely to
be risk averse. 0
The Governor's Commission, in short, was probably correct in attacking rights
of future use, but for more complex reasons than its report explains. The Governor's
Commission seemed to view the legal uncertainty involved in rights to future use as
the source of concern. Yet as explained, the uncertainty is exogenous to the law and
cannot be eliminated through the law. The question instead is who should bear the
burden of the uncertainty, and the guidelines outlined in the last section counsel that
48. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 18-21; see supra notes 30'33 and accompanying text.
49. The application of prospect theory here is very similar to a major justification for adverse
possession; the person in current possession of a resource is likely to view the loss of that resource more
severely than the person not in possession. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal
Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1259-60 (2003) (discussing the relationship between adverse possession and
the endowment effect, which itself is related to prospect theory).
50. Lewis A. Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1037, 1057 n.13
(2000) (noting that the government, as a result of its size, should normally be risk neutral); Kenneth J. Arrow &
Robert Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions, 60 AM. ECON. REv. 364, 374
(1970) (arguing that the government should be risk neutral).
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the individuals and entities with the potential future need for additional water
probably can best bear the uncertainty surrounding the future need.
4. Endangered Species Protection
To consider further the issues involved in allocating the burden of uncertainty,
consider the uncertainty posed for water users by the Endangered Species Act
("ESA"). Water users currently face at least two categories of uncertainty under the
ESA. First, water users face the uncertainty that their water rights will be affected by
the discovery of an endangered species in the waterway from which they draw their
water. Second, even after such a discovery, the amount and timing of water needed to
protect the species may be uncertain.5' The first form of uncertainty stems from
uncertainty regarding what fish species are endangered or threatened and will be
listed under the ESA, while the second stems from scientific uncertainty regarding
the exact needs of protected fish species.
As noted earlier, the government could allocate the burden of the uncertainty to,
among others, (1) current water users (as the ESA appears to do) or (2) the government
and, thus, the public at large (by compensating water users for any water of which they
are deprived or by purchasing needed water rights). Looking at the guidelines outlined
above, water users could make a strong case that the burden should be allocated to the
government. First, the government has better information regarding the status of fish
species and, for those that are endangered, their probable instream water needs, and
thus may face less uncertainty. More importantly, the government is more likely to be
risk-neutral and not suffer psychological costs from uncertainty.
52
Yet there is little pressure (other than from water users themselves) to reallocate
the uncertainty to the government. Why? The reasons point to yet additional factors
that can play into the law's choice of how to allocate the burden of uncertainty. To
many people, equity is the deciding factor under the ESA. In their view, no one
should have the right to withdraw water in a way that threatens endangered or
threatened species; water users are consuming a public resource, and the possibility
that the water users will need to reduce their consumption to protect public interests
is simply one of the costs of using a public resource.53 To other people, the political
ramifications of allocating the uncertainty to the government may be decisive: if the
government bears the uncertainty, there is a risk that the government will try to
reallocate the risk to the species by refusing to pay for additional water when
needed.54
51. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
53. See Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, and What Does That Say About
Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute "Takings"?, 80 IOWA L. REV. 297 (1995)
(arguing that regulation of property rights under the Endangered Species Act should not constitute a taking
because property rights should not encompass the right to use property in a manner to threaten species).
54. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incentives,
49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 363-67 (1997) (discussing the concern that the government will not pay for habitat if it
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B. Legal Uncertainty
Although most uncertainty in the water law field is exogenous to the law, the law
itself also can create significant uncertainty. As discussed by the Commission, for
example, the failure of California law to require recordation of water rights prior to
1914 created uncertainty regarding the ownership of rights on many of the state's
rivers and streams. 5 Similarly, the case-by-case determination of "reasonableness"
under Article X of the California Constitution generates uncertainty "since the
reasonableness of a particular use of water will vary with the facts and circumstances
of the particular case. As in the case of the riparian doctrine, what is at present a
reasonable use of water may not be one in the future. '56 The law did not need to
create uncertainty in these cases. California could have required recordation of water
rights from the outset, and the California Constitution could set out very specific and
clear tests for what is a "reasonable use."
Uncertainty in the law, however, is not always bad. Despite the potential
harms from uncertainty described in Part I of this Article, uncertainty often has
affirmative benefits. Consider the "reasonable use" doctrine. Although the law
could try to define "reasonable use" in very crystalline terms that are easy to
apply and thus make its application to particular water rights relatively
straightforward and predictable, actual applications frequently will raise special
concerns that are not covered by the crystalline rules originally developed.57 The
law commonly resorts to muddy standards such as "reasonable," "beneficial,"
"fair," and "equitable" specifically to provide decision makers with the flexibility
to consider all relevant factors in deciding concrete cases, despite the fact that
such standards create uncertainty.58 In these situations, the law has decided that
the benefits of flexibility outweigh the costs of uncertainty. Perhaps for this
reason, although it listed the "reasonableness" doctrine as an example of the
uncertainties facing California water users, the Governor's Commission did not
recommend that the law abandon a case-by-case approach.59
Eliminating legal uncertainty also can be costly and sometimes not worth the
effort. Despite the uncertainty costs of both unrecorded pre-1914 water rights and
unexercised riparian rights, for example, the Governor's Commission ultimately
decided that the cost of trying to quantify and incorporate all California water
rights into the statutory permit system was simply not worth the reduced
cannot regulate habitat for free).
55. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 17-18.
56. Id. at 21.
57. For classic discussions of the advantages of muddy standards over crystalline rules (and vice-versa),
see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987) and Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud
in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
58. Perhaps this is only another case of exogenous uncertainty. The factors that are likely to prove
relevant in deciding any particular case are often uncertain ahead of time. Because it is impossible to eliminate
this uncertainty in an unpredictable world, the law must decide how to allocate the uncertainty.
59. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 21, 26-27.
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uncertainty. 60 Noting that Oregon previously had spent $8 million to adjudicate
merely seventy percent of its water rights, the Commission concluded "the
benefits do not appear to justify the costs" of complete incorporation. 61
IV. MARKETS AND UNCERTAINTY
Water markets and uncertainty interact in a variety of important manners. As the
Governor's Commission recognized, uncertainty in water rights can undermine water
markets. Perhaps even more importantly, however, various forms of water markets
can help to reduce the societal harm from uncertainty in water rights.
A. The Problem of Uncertainty for Water Markets
Various forms of uncertainty can undermine water markets. Buyers, for
example, want to know that they are receiving the water right that the seller
claims to be selling. If there is uncertainty regarding title to the water right, the
buyer will pay less for the water, reducing and perhaps even eliminating the
range of prices at which a trade can take place. Title insurance developed to
address this problem in the context of markets for real property,62 and title
insurance companies not surprisingly are beginning to sell title insurance for
water rights as water markets grow in the western United States. 63 The
availability of affordable title insurance, however, itself depends on a significant
degree of certainty in the traded property rights.
64
One of the major uncertainties that the Governor's Commission identified as an
impediment to California water markets in 1978 was the "common fear... that a
water user who transfers his right on a temporary basis may lose that right due to the
forfeiture doctrine. 65 As the Governor's Commission pointed out, the law had never
supported this fear.66 But uncertainty nonetheless existed in the minds of water users,
so the Commission recommended the enactment of legislation explicitly providing
that transfers "should not be considered as evidence of waste and unreasonable
use.., and... should not result in forfeiture."
67
60. Id. at 25-26.
61. Id. at 26.
62. See Charles B. DeWitt, lII, Title Insurance: A Primer, 3 TENN. J. PRAC. & PROC. 15, 15-18 (2000)
(describing the history and rationales of title insurance).
63. See, e.g., Stewart Information Services Corp., supra note 42 (describing the new availability in
California and other western states of title insurance for water transactions).
64. See Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1151, 1220 (2000) ("[clarity of title affects the price and availability of title insurance and therefore the
transferability of land to its most highly valued uses.").
65. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 66.
66. See Stevinson Water Dist. v. Roduner, 223 P.2d 209 (Cal. 1950).
67. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 66.
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As this example shows, uncertainty often is intrinsic to the very nature of law
and can prove difficult to eliminate. Despite what statutes or judicial decisions
appear to say, people may fear that courts will interpret the statutes or decisions
in a different fashion or that the law will change. Because western water law
historically was hostile to water markets and to speculative holdings of water
rights, a single judicial precedent was insufficient in 1978 to placate potential
sellers' fears that the law might ultimately strip them of water rights that they
temporarily marketed.68 Indeed, even the explicit statutory changes suggested by
the Governor's Commission proved inadequate to eliminate the uncertainty in
many water users' minds. In the 1980s, the California Legislature adopted at least
ten separate provisions ensuring that temporary transfers would not result in
forfeiture or a finding of unreasonable use and that the water would revert to the
seller at the end of the transfer. 69 When California established an emergency
drought bank in 1991, however, many agricultural water users still balked at
participating because of their continuing fear-i.e., uncertainty-regarding the
security of any water rights that they might transfer on a temporary basis through
the water bank.70 To try to eliminate this uncertainty, the California Legislature
passed an emergency statute yet again assuring sellers that transfers through the
drought bank would not affect their water rights.7'
There are at least two morals to this story. First, because of water law's
historic hostility toward markets, water markets need all of the governmental
affirmation and support that they can get. Over time, all water users are likely to
become comfortable with and confident in their ability to transfer water rights.
Many water users, however, remain uncertain at this relatively early stage of
market development whether water transfers might undermine their underlying
water rights. The flexibility, ambiguity, and evolution inherent in the law make it
difficult to eliminate this uncertainty, increasing the importance of active
governmental assurance and support.
Active wielding by the state or federal government of the "reasonable use"
doctrine to challenge water rights that are the subject of potential water transfers,
as occurred in 2003 in connection with the proposed transfer of water from the
Imperial Irrigation District to San Diego,72 can add to the uncertainty felt by
water users contemplating transfers. As the Governor's Commission pointed out,
what is an "unreasonable use" of water is a case-by-case determination and
68. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Markets and the Problem of Shifting Paradigms, in WATER
MARKETING-THE NEXT GENERATION 1, 6-7 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997) (discussing the
problem of convincing water right holders that legal paradigms have changed despite explicit changes in
statutory law).
69. Id at 7; see, e.g., CAL- WATER CODE §§ 484(a), 1011-1013, 1244, 1731, 1737, 1745.07 (West Supp.
2004).
70. Thompson, supra note 68, at 7.
71. Id.; see Act of April 17, 1991, ch. 1, 1991 Cal. Stat. 1st Ext. Sess. (1991).
72. See Jose Luis Jimenez, Feds Seek Imperial Water Cut, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRtB., July 4, 2003, at A-
1 (discussing challenge by federal government of Imperial Irrigation District's water rights).
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uncertain.73 If proposed transfers draw attention from governmental regulators
for possible waste, potential transferors may conclude that transfer proposals will
increase the uncertainty facing their water rights and thus not be worth the
potential market gain.74
A second, less obvious moral is that attempts to reallocate uncertainty may
themselves create more uncertainty by highlighting the instability of the law
itself. Consider, for example, the problem of unexercised riparian rights
discussed earlier. As explained, a strong argument can be made that unexercised
riparian rights should be abolished because riparians can handle the underlying
uncertainty better than intervening appropriators. 75 But the very act of abolishing
unexercised riparian rights increases the uncertainty that all water users feel
because it highlights the risk that the government may choose in the future to
abolish or modify other water rights.76 Therefore, in deciding whether to
reallocate currently misaligned uncertainty, legislatures and courts must balance
the benefits from the reallocation with the potential costs of creating new
uncertainty for all water users.
B. Water Markets as a Solution to Uncertainty
While the Governor's Commission focused only on the relevance of
uncertainty to water markets, water markets play a pivotal role in reducing the
harm from uncertainty-providing yet another reason why California and other
western states should strive to develop more robust water markets. Water markets
reduce the harm from uncertainty in two principal ways. First, water markets can
enable water users to respond more effectively to the events about which they are
uncertain. Consider again the problem of rights to future use. Without water
markets, appropriators who lose their water to unexercised riparian rights or other
future-use rights may have no option other than reducing their water
consumption which, depending on the exact use of the water, might be extremely
costly.77 With markets, however, appropriators who lose their water to riparians
or municipal water suppliers also enjoy the option of purchasing additional water
supplies, which might be a less expensive solution than reducing consumption.
73. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
74. See Thompson, supra note 68, at 8 (noting fear of Oregon water users that proposed transfers of
conserved water "might result in a finding of waste and a loss of water fights").
75. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
76. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Takings and Water Rights, in WATER LAW: TRENDS, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICE 43 (Kathleen Marion Carr & James D. Crammond eds., 1995) (observing that non-compensated
changes in water rights can undermine the certainty needed to develop robust water markets).
77. Whether reduced consumption is the only option depends on whether unappropriated water is
available and readily transportable to the site of the use. Like most of the West, California enjoys little in the
way of unappropriated water, however, and most of that is not easily transportable to most users. See Indep.
Econ. Analysis Bd., Economics of Water Acquisition Projects, at 5, Jan. 2001, available at http:llwww.
nwcouncil.org/library/ieab/ieab200l-l.pdf (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that water in
many western rivers already has been fully or over-appropriated).
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By lowering the cost to appropriators of losing their water rights, water markets
also reduce the burden of the prospective uncertainty.
Second, water markets allow water users who face uncertainty to reallocate
the uncertainty to individuals or entities that can better bear the risk of the
uncertainty. As discussed earlier, for example, riparians may be able to bear the
risk of an increase in their water needs better than prior appropriators can do both
because they have greater access to information regarding their future needs and
due to prospect theory.78 Without markets, unexercised riparian rights historically
forced appropriators to bear the risk. If unexercised riparian rights had been
marketable, however, appropriators could have responded to the uncertainty by
purchasing the unexercised rights from the riparians, effectively transferring the
uncertainty from themselves back to the riparians.
The ability of markets to "shift" uncertainty is important both because the
law might mistakenly misallocate the burden of uncertainty and because the
government cannot always determine who can best bear the burden. As noted
earlier, individuals and entities may differ considerably in their ability to bear
any specific amount of uncertainty because of different tolerances for risk,
psychological reactions to risk, degrees of future flexibility, and abilities to
spread risk.79 In some cases, these differences might align themselves with
characteristics that are readily transferable into legal rules. Corporations, for
example, are generally likely to be less risk averse than individuals, in part
because they have more ability to diversify. 0 In many instances, however,
differences in risk-bearing ability are likely to be randomly spread among groups
and difficult to link to particular characteristics that the law can use in allocating
uncertainty. Markets, however, do not need to determine who best can bear the
risk: markets rely on people self-identifying through their willingness to enter
into risk-transferring transactions.
81
1. The Example of Global Climate Change
As noted already, global climate change presents a new source of uncertainty
for California water users. Future weather conditions may decrease the amount of
storable runoff at the same time that evaporation and transpiration rates increase,
raising uncertainty regarding long-term water rights and their adequacy to meet
78. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 24, 41-42 and accompanying text.
80. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 530 (1991) (observing that individuals are likely to be more risk averse than
corporations because they have less ability to diversify their risk portfolios).
81. The argument here parallels the reason why markets can be effective tools in pollution regulation.
Markets, unlike traditional regulatory schemes, do not require the government to obtain as much information in
order to achieve the governmental goals. See WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR
OPTIMAL POLLUTION 76 (1974) (noting that pollution taxes require the government to determine the benefits,
but not the cost, of reducing pollution).
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agricultural and other commercial needs.8 2 More importantly, future weather
conditions are likely to be far more variable than they have been historically,
confronting water users with severe drought years sandwiched between extreme
83flood events and, thus, with higher short-term uncertainty.
Water markets can help reduce the burden of this uncertainty both by
providing greater flexibility to water users in responding to changes in water
availability and needs and by permitting water users to reallocate the risk of
uncertainty. Where sudden and unexpected changes in available water supplies
force cutbacks in water deliveries, water markets permit those who can least
afford to cut their water use to obtain additional supplies on the market. Water
markets thus mitigate the overall consequences of the uncertainty. Moreover,
water users who are particularly sensitive to uncertainty, can use water markets
to reduce the uncertainty they face. Risk-adverse water users, for example, can
purchase dry-year options in which other, more flexible water users agree to
transfer water during years with below-average rainfall. For these reasons, a
number of studies have concluded that water markets are an important
institutional answer to the greater uncertainty posed by global climate change.
84
2. The Example of the Environmental Water Account
An interesting and important example of how water markets can reduce the
burdens of uncertainty is the Environmental Water Account ("EWA"), which is
part of the CALFED effort to protect biodiversity in the Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta.85 The ESA currently protects two species of fish in the Delta-the winter-
run Chinook salmon and the Delta smelt.86 To protect the salmon and smelt, the
federal government historically restricted the amount of water that could be
pumped out of the Delta for delivery to farmers and cities south of the Delta
whenever smelt or salmon were in the vicinity of the pumps.8 7 Because the
length, extent, and timing of the pump shutdowns were unpredictable,
agricultural and urban water users who received water from the Delta faced
sizable uncertainty. Water users, moreover, frequently opposed orders to curtail
82. See Gleick, supra note 5, at 25-33, 37-49.
83. Id. at 34-37.
84. See, e.g., id. at 118-20.
85. For general information about the Environmental Water Account, see California's web site for the
EWA at http://calwater.ca.gov/Programs/EnvironmentalwaterAccount/EnvironmentalwaterAccount.shtm], as
well as the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation's web site for the EWA at http://www.usbr.gov/mplEWAlindex.htm.
See also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y. REV. 261, 307-14
(2000) (discussing the innovative advantages of the EWA).
86. See 55 Fed. Reg. 12,191 (Apr. 2, 1989) (listing the winter-run Chinook salmon as threatened); 59
Fed. Reg. 440 (Jan. 4, 1994) (listing the winter-run Chinook salmon as endangered); 58 Fed. Reg. 12,863 (Mar.
5, 1993) (listing the Delta smelt as threatened).
87. Cal. Bay Delta Authority, The Environmental Water Account: Reducing Conflict Between Fishery
Management and Water Supply, at http://calwater.ca.gov/Newsroom/FactSheets/FactSheetEWAWhitePaper
_1-22-03.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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or shut down Delta deliveries, leading to significant political conflict and often
leading to delays in the pumping reductions that the federal government believed
important to protect the listed fish species.88
To address these issues, the CALFED agencies developed the EWA. Under
the EWA, California and the federal government purchase and store water each
year.89 If the governments decide that the pumps need to be curtailed or shut
down under the ESA to protect the salmon and smelt, the governments make up
for the reduced water withdrawals from the Delta with the water that they have
purchased and stored.90 A principal goal of the EWA is to avoid reducing
deliveries to farmers and cities south of the Delta as a result of the ESA.9' If
pumping is reduced from the Delta, farmers and cities that otherwise would face
decreased deliveries receive purchased water instead.
The EWA is an innovative response to the scientific uncertainty concerning
the water needs of winter-run chinook salmon and Delta smelt. Prior to the EWA,
farmers and urban water users bore the burden of the uncertainty. Because of the
uncertainty, farmers and urban water suppliers found it more difficult to plan.
Risk-averse farmers, moreover, chafed under the uncertainty that they faced
yearly. To help reduce the burden of that uncertainty, water users used their
political power to oppose proposed changes in pumping operations, making
timely implementation of the ESA difficult.
The EWA addresses the problems posed by this uncertainty in part by
reallocating the uncertainty from the water users, who now are effectively
assured deliveries, to the governments, which now must purchase needed water.
The governments might well be better risk bearers both because they are likely to
be less risk averse than individual water users and, more importantly, because
they have greater access to information with which to reduce the uncertainty.
Indeed, the governments have responded to the uncertainty that they now bear
under the EWA by working to develop both better research on the water needs of
the listed fish species and better models and projections for when the pumps must
be shut down to protect the fish.92 The reallocation of the uncertainty to the
governments, in short, has provided the governments with a valuable incentive to
reduce the scientific uncertainty facing the pumping system-and, thus, the
overall burden of the uncertainty on society.
The EWA also uses water markets to reduce the burden of uncertainty.
Absent water markets and the EWA, farmers who found Delta pumping curtailed
88. Id.
89. CALFED Bay-Delta Program, CALFED Bay-Delta Program's Environmental Water Account Facts
and Background, at http://calwater.ca.gov/Programs/EnvironmentalWaterAccount/FactSheet.htm (last visited
Sept. 3, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
90. Id.
91. See Envtl. Water Account Review Bd., First Annual Review of the Environmental Water Account
for the CALFED Bay-Delta Program 4 (2001), available at http://science.calwater.ca.gov/pdf/2001_EWA_
Science_ ReviewWorkshop.pdf (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
92. Envtl. Water Account Review Bd., supra note 36, at 4-6.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 36
and their water deliveries reduced could do nothing about it, even if they faced
severe losses as a result of the water reductions. Under the EWA, the government
can purchase the water that it needs on the open market from those water users
who presumably can best afford to reduce their water consumption. This use of
water markets reduces the overall cost of the uncertainty. The EWA, moreover,
has begun to use water markets to hedge its risks. Rather than guessing how
much water it needs to purchase in advance, the EWA uses some of its funding to
purchase water options that it must exercise only if it finds later in the year that it
needs additional water supplies. The EWA thus transfers some of the uncertainty
that it faces to water users who are willing to take on the risk.
Water users, of course, could have achieved much the same result through
private use of water markets. Water users who faced sudden curtailment in water
rights could, if the water reductions were too costly to their operations, have
purchased additional water through private markets. Water users also could have
reduced the uncertainty that they faced by purchasing water options as a form of
insurance against later water reductions. The EWA, however, achieves




A number of commissions and academics over the years have concluded that
uncertainty poses a major problem for California water users.94 The significance
of that problem has never been empirically tested. Water users faced with
uncertainty are always likely to complain, so it is difficult to know whether
uncertainty is a severe problem leading to significant economic costs, as water
users claim, or a minor nuisance. Uncertainty, however, is clearly a burden on
society to some degree. And the amount of uncertainty faced by water users has
increased significantly since the Governor's Commission issued its report.
The report of the Governor's Commission unfortunately gives the impression
that the legal doctrines that we choose generates most of this uncertainty and that
legal reform can rid the water field of the uncertainty. As explained, most
uncertainty is exogenous to the law and cannot be eliminated by the law.95 In
93. Water users have preferred the EWA, of course, not only for its economies of scale and expertise but
also because the government has paid for all necessary water purchases from the public treasury. However, the
public need not fiscally support the EWA. All farmers who wish to reduce the risk that they face from the
ESA's uncertainty, for example, could voluntary pay into the EWA. Or the government could support the ESA
through a tax on all water users-effectively forcing the water users to hedge their risks through the EWA.
94. For example, over half a century before the Governor's Commission, the California Conservation
Commission, whose report led to the major changes in California water law in 1913, also concluded that
uncertainty was one of the major problems facing California water law. See STATE CONSERVATION COMM'N,
REPORT OF THE CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA TO THE GOVERNOR AND
LEGISLATURE OF CALIFORNIA 21-26 (1912).
95. See supra Part I.A.
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these instances, the best that the law can do is to allocate the uncertainty in a
manner that minimizes the overall societal burden of the uncertainty and to
promote methods by which water users can mitigate the uncertainty that they
face.96 Even legally created uncertainty is not always bad. The law often benefits
from flexibility, even though flexibility creates uncertainty.97 Eliminating
uncertainty, moreover, is often costly.98
One of the most important steps that the State can take to address the
problem of uncertainty is to promote water markets. Although the Governor's
Commission recognized that uncertainty can undermine water markets, it failed
to emphasize the more important point that water markets are an important tool
for reducing the burden of uncertainty. Because water markets permit water users
who face unexpected reductions in water supplies to acquire additional water,
water markets reduce the cost of uncertainty in water deliveries. Water markets,
moreover, permit water users to hedge against such uncertainty by acquiring
options that can be used if and when water deliveries are curtailed.
96. See supra Part III.A.2.
97. See supra Part L.B.
98. See supra Part HI.B.
